September 23, 2026 marks exactly two years since Anura Kumara Dissanayake assumed office as Executive President. The presidential election on September 21, 2024, proved to be a critical turning point in Sri Lanka’s political history.

Since the executive presidency system was introduced in 1978, nine presidents have held office in Sri Lanka. For generations, political power revolved strictly within the hands of a traditional political elite. Apart from Ranasinghe Premadasa, Maithripala Sirisena, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake, all six other presidents hailed from established family dynasties, elite backgrounds, and traditional political structures.   

Among them, Dissanayake’s rise is uniquely distinct. Coming from a simple agricultural family background in Tambuttegama in the North Central Province, he emerged as the leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a party with a history of armed rebellions, and eventually assumed office as the nation’s ninth Executive President through the NPP. This shift was widely described as a ‘class transition of political power’.   

Following Dissanayake’s swearing-in on September 23, 2024, Jayadeva Uyangoda, one of the country’s leading political science professors, wrote in an article titled ‘Power Shift and Political Uprising in Sri Lanka’:

“The swearing-in of Dissanayake as the new President marks a historically significant fresh start. It signifies a sudden shift in the class foundations of political power—moving away from a small, Colombo-centric, Westernized, and wealthy elite toward a coalition of non-elite social forces.

“If Sri Lanka’s democracy guaranteed the uninterrupted continuity of the elite class in political power since independence from colonial rulers in 1948, it has now brought about a clear departure from the past. This is a dramatic moment that democracy and free, fair elections can occasionally produce.

“In particular, the presidential election results represent a peaceful, bloodless transfer of power. The new President secured his mandate with a promise to overhaul a corrupt, entrenched governance system that had remained the birthright of wealthy social classes for nearly seven decades. The class monopoly over political power, long institutionalized through democracy, was dismantled by the general public itself.

“As representatives from non-elite social backgrounds, President Dissanayake and the NPP government carry the responsibility to prove that they can act as good rulers and true democrats who respect the genuine desires for change among the people.”

Against this backdrop, as President Dissanayake completes two years in office, this article examines his governance, achievements, shortcomings, and potential future trajectories in comparison with previous presidential administrations.

Traditional establishment rulers, from J.R. Jayewardene to Ranil Wickremesinghe, maintained the presidency as the ultimate center of power, characterized by luxury and extensive security retinues. However, in line with his modest background, Dissanayake focuses on presenting himself to the public both in appearance and practice as an unpretentious president.

Under many previous administrations, most notably the reign of the Rajapaksa brothers, family dominance reached its peak across all sectors of governance. A critical shift in Dissanayake’s administration is the creation of an environment entirely free from dynastic politics. Neither the President nor his ministers are typically seen in public alongside their spouses.

Despite various criticisms regarding the JVP’s Marxist background, administration under the guidance of the National People’s Power (NPP) is centered on a form of leftist discipline and collective leadership. It prioritizes party policy decisions over individual personal whims. However, those very decisions remain subject to significant debate.

Although coming to power by criticizing the IMF-backed structural adjustment program initiated by the Ranil Wickremesinghe government for economic recovery, the NPP was compelled to continue the same agreement to prevent further economic collapse, lacking a viable practical alternative. Whether the NPP possesses a distinct economic policy of its own remains unclear to observers.

In line with campaign promises, the government finds itself bound by the conditions of international financial institutions, unable to deliver tax cuts or major economic relief to middle- and working-class citizens. Despite promising during the election to renegotiate the IMF agreement, the NPP has been unable to achieve this over the past two years.

The public welcomes and supports the government’s efforts to expedite investigations into corruption, financial malpractices, and fraud from previous regimes, alongside initiatives to introduce greater transparency in the public sector. Measures taken to curb drug trafficking and underworld syndicate activities are particularly notable.

However, regarding the issues of minority communities—specifically the legitimate political aspirations, devolution of power, and humanitarian issues arising from the three-decade war affecting the Tamil-speaking people of the North and East—the NPP government displays a reluctance similar to that of previous administrations.

President Dissanayake and government leaders repeatedly assert that treating all communities equally and preventing the resurgence of racism and religious extremism represent their firm policy. Yet, speaking merely of the concept of equality without resolving the specific challenges faced by the Tamil people as a consequence of the war remains meaningless.

The government shows no willingness to release fertile lands belonging to civilians that remain under military control in the North and East, nor to establish fact-finding mechanisms regarding past war crimes and enforced disappearances.

Despite promising to conduct provincial council elections within a year of assuming office, the NPP has failed to fulfill this even as two years have passed. Instead, public suspicion is growing that the government is employing tactics like parliamentary select committees to further delay these elections.

The JVP has a bitter history of fiercely opposing all previous efforts undertaken toward power sharing. Therefore, there is little reason to believe that an NPP government would be genuinely interested in conducting provincial council elections or implementing the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.

The provincial council system, introduced nearly forty years ago through Indian intervention, remains the only legal provision for power sharing in the Sri Lankan Constitution. Grave doubts naturally arise regarding its fate under a government effectively controlled by the JVP.

JVP leaders, including General Secretary Tilvin Silva, state that the provincial council system will continue until a new constitution is introduced. However, administering the provinces through governors, who act as direct representatives of the President, without holding provincial council elections is akin to mocking the principle of power devolution.

The government can earn the trust of the Tamil people on this matter only if it ensures that elected representatives of the people manage the provincial councils until a new constitution is brought into force.

Because the NPP is a new party in power and given the class background of its leadership, it faces crises in implementing certain policy decisions due to a lack of experience in fully navigating the traditional state machinery and the high-level bureaucratic class. Key ministers have even expressed this openly with frustration. This demonstrates that effective change cannot be brought about while retaining the old state apparatus that historically served the traditional political establishment.

President Dissanayake will have to face severe challenges during the remaining three years of his term. A government attempting to advance a new constitutional drafting process in the latter half of its tenure faces numerous obstacles. Strong doubts are emerging regarding the likelihood of abolishing the executive presidency during Dissanayake’s current term.

The reality is that President Dissanayake is transforming into a ‘social democrat’, aligning with the capitalist global economic order rather than emphasizing leftist ideologies.

If his administration fails to meet public expectations while pursuing IMF conditions and debt restructuring processes, it will inevitably face resistance from trade unions and mass organizations.

The success or failure of President Dissanayake’s future governance hinges on his decisions regarding power-sharing and reforms that recognize Sri Lanka’s diversity and win the trust of minority communities.

Meanwhile, the political relationship between JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva and President Dissanayake, where Silva is perceived as the power behind the throne, is a critically observed feature of contemporary Sri Lankan politics.

While Dissanayake serves as the public face and charismatic leader of the JVP, Silva acts as the primary organizer who retains control over the party machinery and ideological discipline. Traditionally in Sri Lankan politics, the President serves as the absolute center of power within their party. However, in the case of the JVP, despite Dissanayake holding executive presidential power, General Secretary Silva seems to exercise overwhelming influence over party decisions and policymaking.

Although the cabinet led by Dissanayake manages state administration, Silva bridges the gap between the expectations of party cadres and government decisions. Political analysts point out that this creates a dual power structure; the Presidential Secretariat on one side, and JVP headquarters in Pelawatte on the other.

Observers widely suggest that if IMF conditions or economic reforms deepen public dissatisfaction in the future, ideological conflicts could emerge between the party’s hardline leftist wing led by Silva and President Dissanayake, who faces practical governance challenges.

At the same time, opinions vary regarding the current popularity of the NPP government and President Dissanayake. While criticism and a decline in support are evident in certain areas compared to initial high expectations, the overall public satisfaction rate appears to remain relatively strong.

The NPP, which secured 61% of the vote in the 2024 parliamentary elections, saw its share drop to 43% in the 2025 local government elections. This decline is believed to be one of the reasons behind the government’s hesitation to expedite provincial council elections.

Even as dissatisfaction with the government grows, the absence of a strong, credible opposition works to the administration’s advantage. Furthermore, no opposition leader currently matches Dissanayake’s leadership persona.

As the initial wave of overwhelming support cools and citizens face practical economic hardships, a natural decline in NPP’s influence is expected. This likely explains President Dissanayake’s decision to lead district-level rallies to mobilize public support for his administration’s position.